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DISPOSING OF LEAKS AND SPILLS: PASSIVE 
DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES UNDER 
CERCLA 
Even in a supposedly modern and technologically advanced world, 
most people have no reason to think about what happens to hazardous 
waste, or the problems that it poses for society. Most of us will never 
witness a hazardous waste release, and many of us have never heard of the 
tragedy of Love Canal.1 Nevertheless, as Love Canal reminded America 
decades ago, hazardous waste disposal poses significant health risks and 
economic costs for our society.  
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) imposes liability for and regulates such 
hazardous waste cleanup.2 CERCLA imposes liability on four categories 
of potentially responsibly parties (“PRPs”).3 Section 9607(a)(2) imposes 
liability on any party who owned the regulated facility in question at the 
time of disposal of hazardous wastes.4 “Disposal” is the key word, and its 
definition has sparked debate among federal courts and commentators 
alike.5 CERCLA defines “disposal” as the “discharge, deposit, injection, 
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous 
 1. Love Canal refers to a canal near Niagara Falls in which 20,000 tons of chemical wastes were 
buried. DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA’S TOXICS 
POLICY FOR THE 1990S 3 (1992). In 1977, a river overflowed sending the wastes into the surrounding 
community. Id. President Carter declared the area an emergency disaster area. Id.  
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).  
 3. Id. Under relevant portions, the potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) are (1) “the owner 
and operator of a vessel or a facility”; and (2) “any person who at the time of disposal of any 
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed 
of.” Id. (emphasis added). CERCLA states that potentially responsible parties might be liable for:  
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a 
State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the 
national contingency plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the 
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; 
and 
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 
9604(i) of this title.  
Id.  
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2000). 
 5. Craig May, Taking Action—Rejecting the Passive Disposal Theory of Prior Owner Liability 
Under CERCLA, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 385, 385 (1998). The author asserts, “The meaning of disposal 
determines which prior owners will be liable for cleanup of a contaminated site, a cleanup that can 
often cost millions of dollars.” Id. at 387. 
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waste into or on any land or water.”6 While the definition seems 
straightforward, courts and commentators nevertheless disagree over 
whether any action, passive or active, may constitute a disposal. Courts 
must decide whether disposal should require affirmative human conduct, 
or whether a PRP who has not affirmatively or actively contributed to a 
disposal should be liable for the leaking or migration of wastes. In other 
words, courts must decide whether a passive disposal can trigger liability 
under CERCLA.7 Differing answers to this question suggest strong 
disagreement over the level of causation courts should read into CERCLA 
liability provisions.8  
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000). CERCLA defines “disposal” by way of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2000). The definition in its entirety reads:  
The term “disposal” means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or 
placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid 
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted 
into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). 
 7. Most commentators have argued against passive disposal theories. See, e.g., Robert L. 
Bronston, The Case Against Intermediate Owner Liability Under CERCLA for Passive Migration of 
Hazardous Waste, 93 MICH. L. REV. 609 (1994) (arguing that Congress intended disposal to have an 
active meaning, and therefore the theory of passive migration should be rejected); Michael S. Caplan, 
Escaping CERCLA Liability: The Interim Owner Passive Migration Defense Gains Circuit 
Recognition, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10121, 10121 (1998) (arguing that “CERCLA’s language, structure, 
and policies compel the conclusion that passive migration of hazardous substances during ownership 
does not trigger CERCLA liability.”); Lisa A. Lee, Guilty for Having Done Nothing: Passive Past 
Owners Face CERCLA Liability, 1 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 88 (1993) (contending that Nurad 
was wrongly decided and passive migration should not be a basis for liability); Rita H. McMillen, 
Liability for Passive Disposal of Hazardous Wastes Under CERCLA, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 283 
(1993) (stating “‘disposal’ is confined to active human behavior.”); Henry L. Stephens, When is 
“Leaching” not “Leaking”?: CERCLA Liability of Owners and Operators at the Time of Disposal, 24 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10177 (1994) (arguing that Nurad is flawed and that no passive disposal should trigger 
liability of prior owners and operators); Cf. Joseph Lipinski, Last Owner Liability for Passive 
Migration Under CERCLA, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 97, 97 (1998) (concluding that ‘disposal’ 
should be interpreted to include passive migration,” not just passive disposal in general); Catherine S. 
Stempien, Sins of Omission, Commission and Emission: Does CERCLA’s Definition of “Disposal” 
Include Passive Activities? 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 24 (1994) (concluding that neither a completely 
active nor a passive/active interpretation of disposal “makes any sense given the purpose and 
framework of the statute as a whole”). 
 8. Many authors frame the issue in a manner that reveals a larger concern with whether the PRP 
affirmatively contributed to the contamination. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 10177 (“Some recent 
court decisions have interpreted this language expansively to include essentially every grantee in the 
chain of title to contaminated realty, irrespective of the grantee’s acts, omissions, or authority to 
control practices regarding hazardous substances at the site.”) (emphasis added); Lee, supra note 7, at 
88 (“Passive past owners (PPOs) who once owned contaminated property and who did not contribute 
to or even know of the contamination may be potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under 
[CERCLA].”) (emphasis added); May, supra note 5, at 385 (“[O]ne issue that has been sharply 
contested is whether a prior owner of property on which there was pollution should be liable for 
cleanup, even if the owner did nothing actively to cause the pollution.”) (emphasis added); McMillen, 
supra note 7, at 260 (“A broad definition of ‘disposal’ creates liability for parties that did not actively 
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Nevertheless, and despite an apparent circuit split between the Second, 
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, the ambiguity surrounding the definition 
of disposal once appeared to have been resolved.9 Until recently, most 
courts held that passive disposal activities were insufficient for 
establishing liability under § 9607(a)(2), instead requiring affirmative 
human conduct by the PRP.10 A recent case before the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals has not only drawn new attention to the apparent circuit split, 
but also has suggested that the “split” was never very sharp. Moreover, 
this case provides a new method for analyzing the meaning of disposal.11 
This Note contends that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly 
decided Carson Harbor Village v. Unocal Corp, and that other courts 
deciding whether a passive activity constitutes a disposal under CERCLA 
should follow Carson’s principles.12 This Note argues that the definition 
of disposal under CERCLA contemplates both active and passive 
activities. Under such an analysis, a passive leak should trigger a PRP’s 
liability under § 9607(a)(2), regardless of whether the PRP affirmatively 
participated in the disposal. At the same time, this Note argues that passive 
migration of contaminants into soil should not be considered a disposal 
under CERCLA. Excluding passive migration while permitting other 
instances of passive disposal would resolve many of the concerns 
associated with a broader passive disposal theory without implicating the 
same dangers. 
bury waste in the ground and are not current landowners.”). 
 9. Some commentators considered the issue resolved.  
Until now, it has generally been accepted that the owner or operator of real estate not actively 
involved in the disposal of a hazardous substance had no liability under CERCLA. Now the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an owner/operator may be subject for liability 
for clean costs if the property was contaminated from prior use (i.e., passive migration) 
during the period when the owner or operator had control of the property.  
REAL EST. L. REP., Feb. 30, 2001, at  5. This comment somewhat overstates the understanding because 
CERCLA largely imposes strict liability on current owners and operators, regardless of whether they 
were actively involved. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). However, as to prior owners and operators, which 
are covered by § 9607(a)(2), this article reflects a strong trend in the federal courts. See infra note 10. 
 10. When addressing this issue, many courts simply adopted the holding of the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals as the leading opinion, and held that passive disposal does not trigger liability. See, 
e.g., Servco Pacific Inc. v. Dods, 106 F. Supp.2d 1034, 1048 (D. Haw. 2000) (holding that disposal 
required affirmative conduct); In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 994 F. Supp. 638, 668 (D.V.I. 
1998) (holding that passive migration of hazardous wastes does not constitute disposal); Plaskon 
Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 653 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (stating that 
passive migration of hazardous wastes does not constitute disposal, although leaking or spilling might 
suffice). 
 11. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
 12. 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); 227 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 
S.Ct. 1437 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2002).  
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Part I of this Note reviews relevant CERCLA provisions and 
CERCLA’s purpose as a remedial statute. Part II reviews the passive 
disposal controversy and the varied holdings of federal courts on this 
issue. Part III discusses the Ninth Circuit Carson decision. Part IV of this 
Note introduces the circuit court decisions concerning passive disposal. 
Finally, Part V of this Note presents the author’s proposal.  
I. CERCLA HISTORY  
Congress passed CERCLA, also known as the Superfund Law, in 1980 
to facilitate cleanup of hazardous and solid waste releases.13 On the eve of 
a new administration, Congress passed CERCLA rapidly, leaving little 
legislative history to aid interpretation of the statute.14 Without useful 
legislative history concerning the word “disposal,” federal courts construe 
the definition by considering CERCLA’s overall purpose.15 Courts 
commonly state that the primary purposes of CERCLA are to assure the 
“prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and [to impose] all cleanup costs 
on the responsible party.”16 Other courts indicate that the purpose is not to 
impose costs on the responsible party, but to impose costs on the owners 
and operators to the largest extent possible instead of placing the burden 
on the general taxpayers.17  
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000). The Supreme Court has explained the Superfund by stating,  
CERCLA imposes an excise tax on petroleum and other specified chemicals. The Act 
establishes a trust fund, commonly known as “Superfund,” 87.5% of which is financed 
through the excise tax, and the remainder through general revenues. Superfund money may be 
used to clean up releases of hazardous substances and for certain other purposes.  
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359 (1986). 
 14. See Rosemary J. Beless, Superfund’s Innocent Landowner Defense: Guilty Until Proven 
Innocent, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES AND & ENVTL. L. 247, 248 (1997) (“CERCLA has little legislative 
history because Congress passed it in the final days of the lame duck session of the outgoing ninety-
sixth Congress in response to the enormous public outcry stemming from the Love Canal disaster. 
Moreover, as a result of this swift passage, courts were forced to struggle with congressional intent 
when attempting to interpret provisions of the statute.”); May, supra note 5, at 388 (“CERCLA has 
very little legislative history in general and almost nothing on the meaning of disposal.”). For a brief 
overview of CERCLA, see John C. Cruden, CERCLA OVERVIEW American Law Institute-
American Bar Association, SF97 ALI-ABA 397 (2001).  
 15. See, e.g., United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 717 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 16. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys. Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 17. Horsehead Industries, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 258 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“[The purpose of CERCLA is] to assure that the current and future costs associated with 
hazardous waste facilities, including post-closure costs, will be adequately financed and, to the greatest 
extent possible, borne by the owners and operators of such facilities.”); Aviall Serv. Inc. v. Cooper 
Indus. Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 136-37 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[CERLA’s purpose is to] facilitate the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites, and to shift the costs of environmental response from the taxpayers to the 
parties who benefited from the use or disposal of the hazardous substances.”). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/12
p945 Coleman Note book pages.doc 1/13/2003   1:14 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] DISPOSING OF LEAKS AND SPILLS 949 
 
 
 
 
 
II. PASSIVE DISPOSAL IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
A. District Court Interpretation of “Disposal” 
 
District courts defined disposal under § 9607(a)(2) in varying ways. 
Some courts have held that passive migration definitively constitutes a 
disposal triggering liability.18 Other courts have held that passive 
migration specifically is not a disposal triggering liability.19 Still other 
courts have held that no passive disposal whatsoever triggers liability 
under § 9607(a)(2).20 Finally, several cases have conceded that passive 
disposal might trigger liability under certain circumstances.21  
One of the first and more influential district court decisions was United 
States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc. 22 In Petersen, the federal 
government sued Petersen Sand & Gravel for remedial costs under 
§ 9607(a)(2).23 The court held that passive disposal in the form of leaking 
or leaching does not trigger liability of prior owners and operators under 
CERCLA.24 In reaching its decision, the court considered the definitions 
of “disposal” and “release” under CERCLA.25 First, the court suggested 
 18. See Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1995) 
(“While it may seem inequitable, the mere migration of contaminants from adjacent land constitutes 
disposal for the purposes of CERCLA, and passive downstream landowners are liable for the cleanup 
costs resulting from their neighbors’ activities.”). 
 19. See In re Tutu Wells, 994 F. Supp. at 638; Plaskon Elec. Materials, 904 F. Supp. at 644; 
Snediker Developers Ltd. P’ship v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Ecodyne Corp., 
v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457-58 (N.D. Cal. 1989); In re Diamond Reo Truckers, Inc., 115 B.R. 
559, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990).  
 20. See Idylwoods Assoc. v. Mader Capital, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1290, 1311 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(“Congress did not intend so expansive a definition of disposal so as to include the concept of passive 
disposal.”).  
 21. See Stanley Works v. Snyder Gen. Corp, 781 F. Supp. 659, 660-61 (E.D. Cal. 1990). The 
Stanley Works court phrases the issue as “the extent to which the ongoing leaking, leaching, and 
migration of hazardous substances constitutes a release or disposal giving rise to liability under 
CERCLA under section 9607(a)(2).” Id. at 662. See also Reading Co. v. Philadelphia, 155 B.R. 890, 
898 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The Reading court drew a distinction between a leak that occurs after the initial 
disposal, which properly qualifies as a passive leak, and a leak that initiates a disposal, which does not 
qualify as a passive disposal. Id.  
 22. 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 23. Id. at 1349.  
 24. Id. at 1351. 
 25. Id. The court also considered the words of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Edward 
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988):  
We are enforcing a statute rather than modifying rules of common law . . . to the point that 
courts could achieve “more” of the legislative objectives by adding to the lists of those 
responsible, it is enough to respond that statures have not only ends but also limits. Born of 
compromise, laws such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue their ends to their logical 
limits. A court’s job is to find and enforce stopping points no less than to implement other 
legislative choices.  
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that, because “release” must necessarily be broader than “disposal,” 
Congress intended that “disposal” would contemplate only active 
conduct.26 Second, the court centered on the requirement in the definition 
of disposal that the waste “may enter the environment or be emitted into 
the air or discharged into any waters.”27 The court contrasted this language 
with the language under the definition of “release,” which includes only 
“into the environment.”28 The court concluded that Congress intended that 
an affirmative act would be required to constitute a disposal, but would not 
be required for a release.29 The court also indicated that the addition of the 
innocent landowner defense to the statute supported its conclusion that 
“‘disposal’ refers to a discrete human act with a discrete ending.”30 For the 
Id. at 157.  
 26. Petersen, 806 F. Supp. at 1352.  
 27. Id. at 1351. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 1352. The innocent owner defense is an affirmative defense provided by CERCLA. 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2000). The defense provides that there will be no liability for a party who can 
show “by a preponderance of the evidence” that “the release or threat of release . . . and the damages 
resulting” were caused solely by: 
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than 
one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing 
directly or indirectly . . . if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that 
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into 
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and 
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such 
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions. 
Id. When finding that disposal must be active in order to preserve the innocent owner defense, the 
Petersen court explained: 
[F]or the defense to apply in all but the rarest of circumstances, “disposal” must be limited to 
its active meaning. Otherwise, this defense would be available only to innocent owners who 
are fortunate enough to have purchased a facility where all the hazardous waste is sealed in 
concrete—any seeping or leaking on a site occurring after the purchase would eliminate the 
defense. Put simply, the amendment on its face has a plain purpose: to exclude from liability 
owners who bought after the hazardous waste was placed on the land and knew nothing about 
the hazardous waste at the time of purchase. 
806 F. Supp. at 1352. Commentators also suggest that that permitting passive disposal would destroy 
the innocent landowner defense. See Beless, supra note 14; Shane Clanton, Passive Disposal of the 
Innocent Landowner Defense, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 255, 255 (1994). On the other hand, 
CERCLA cases suggest that the defense may apply not apply to prior owners and operators at all. See 
CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 717:  
The innocent owner defense's apparent limitation to current owners also supports the 
conclusion that “disposal” does not encompass the passive spreading alleged here. The 
provision establishing the innocent owner defense states: “Nothing in this paragraph or in 
section 9607(b)(3) of this title [, which provides the causation defenses including the third 
party defense,] shall diminish the liability of any previous owner or operator who would be 
otherwise liable under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C). This language certainly 
suggests that the innocent owner defense is unavailable to prior owners or operators. 
Id. at 716-17. Cf. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 91 
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Petersen court, “[t]he inescapable conclusion [was] that giving ‘disposal’ a 
passive meaning controverts the plain language of CERCLA.”31 
B. “Disposal” in the United States Courts of Appeals 
Later that year, in Nurad, Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a passive leak constitutes a disposal under 
CERCLA.32 In Nurad, the current owners of contaminated property sought 
reimbursement from prior owners for removing underground storage tanks 
and their hazardous contents.33 One of the prior owner defendants, Hooper 
& Sons, Co. (“Hooper”), used underground storage tanks on the property 
and did not properly dispose of the tanks or their contents when the 
business discontinued use of the tanks.34 The contents leaked into the 
surrounding soil.35 The district court found Hooper liable because Hooper 
had been affirmatively involved with the use of the tanks.36 However, the 
court found that the owners subsequent to Hooper were not liable because 
they had no affirmative involvement with the tanks or the disposal of 
hazardous wastes.37 The district court granted summary judgment for those 
defendants, reasoning that disposal required “some element of affirmative 
participation of [each] defendant”—in other words, the court ruled that 
CERCLA precluded liability for passive disposal.38 The Fourth Circuit 
reversed, holding that prior owners and operators were liable for passive 
disposal.39 The Fourth Circuit explained, “the statute plainly imposes 
liability on a party who owns a facility at the time hazardous waste leaks 
from an underground storage tank on the premises.”40 The appellate court 
found that the lower court’s holding was erroneous because it “ignore[d] 
the language of the statute, contradict[ed] clear circuit precedent and 
(2d Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the defense does apply to prior owners and operators).  
 31. 806 F. Supp. at 1352.  
 32. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992). The district court also considered whether tenants were liable 
under CERCLA for remediation costs. Id. at 842. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court and 
found that the tenants at hand did not have the authority prescribed by CERCLA. These tenants were 
entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 844.  
 33. Id. at 840. 
 34. Id. at 840.  
 35. Id. at 840-41.  
 36. Id. at 841. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 840. 
 40. Id. The court reasoned that “[a]ny other result would substantially undermine CERCLA's 
goal of encouraging voluntary cleanup on the part of those in a position to do so.” Id.  
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frustrate[d] the fundamental purposes of CERCLA.”41  
The Nurad court used several lines of rationale.42 First, the Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that, while some of the words contained in the definition 
of “disposal” were clearly active, others “readily admit to a passive 
component: hazardous waste may leak or spill without any active human 
participation.”43 The Nurad court added that the district court’s 
interpretation “arbitrarily deprived these words of their passive element by 
imposing a requirement of active participation as a prerequisite to 
liability.”44 Second, the Nurad court reasoned that the district court’s 
interpretation would encourage owners to “avoid liability simply by 
standing idle while an environmental hazard festers on his property.”45 
Third, the court said that the district court’s view contradicted CERCLA’s 
strict liability focus.46 The Fourth Circuit refused to add additional fault 
requirements to the statute.47 
Around the time of the Nurad decision, many of the courts that had 
decided the issue were in agreement: passive disposal could trigger 
liability of PRPs.48 However, the tide changed with the next federal 
appellate court to decide the issue.49  
In United States v. CDMG Realty Co., the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that passive migration did not trigger PPR liability under 
§ 9607(a)(2).50 CDMG involved ten acres of land that had once been part 
of a landfill.51 After an EPA investigation, the federal government sued the 
 41. Id. at 844. 
 42. Id. at 845-46. 
 43. Id. at 845. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. The court asserted that, at the same time, “[a] more conscientious owner who undertakes 
the task of cleaning up the environmental hazard would, on the other hand, be liable as the current 
owner of the facility, since ‘disposal’ is not part of the current owner liability scheme,” an outcome 
that Congress could not have intended. Id. at 845-46.  
 46. Id. at 846. 
 47. Id. The court concluded, “Thus we hold that § 9607(a)(2) imposes liability . . . for ownership 
of the facility at a time that hazardous waste was ‘spilling’ or ‘leaking.’” Id.  
 48. See Clanton, supra note 30, at n.32; Stephens, supra note 7, at 10181 (“[Nurad] has been 
followed in lemming-like fashion by district courts . . . .”). Cf. May, supra note 5, at 386 (“At the time 
of the Petersen decision, cases were fairly evenly split on the issue, with some commentators asserting 
that the Nurad decision, given its appellate status, represented the majority view.”).  
 49. CMDG Realty, 96 F.3d at 711.  
 50. Id. The current owner had two theories of recovery. The first was a passive 
migration/disposal theory because the contaminants migrated during the ownership of the prior parties. 
Id. at 710. The second theory was based upon active disposal through dispersal of contaminants. Id. 
The Third Circuit rejected the passive theory, affirming the district court. Id. at 711. With respect to 
the second theory, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, finding that the district court should not 
have granted summary judgment. Id.  
 51. Id. The land was located in Morris County, New Jersey. Id.  
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current owner for the costs of cleanup.52 The current owner subsequently 
sued a previous owner for contribution, contending that the prior owner 
was liable because contaminants buried in the landfill had migrated 
through the landfill during its period of ownership.53 The CDMG court 
distinguished Nurad and chose not to decide whether a passive leak or 
spill constituted a disposal, explaining that it was unnecessary to decide 
whether “disposal” was by definition active.54 According to the CDMG 
court, whatever definition of disposal in the broad sense, “[the] definition 
cannot encompass the spreading of waste at issue here.”55  
The Third Circuit presented essentially the same arguments as the 
Petersen court.56 The CDMG court also compared the definitions of 
“release” and “disposal,” finding that “release” encompassed “disposal;” 
therefore, “release” was necessarily broader.57 Furthermore, the court 
reasoned that if Congress were to sanction a passive migration theory of 
disposal, it “would be a rather complicated way of making liable all people 
who owned or operated a facility after the introduction of waste into the 
facility.”58  
The CDMG court argued that although CERCLA was not “written with 
great clarity,” it would not assume that Congress had intended to cast a 
never-ending net of liability.59 The court also found that a passive 
migration interpretation would weaken the innocent landowner defense.60 
The court concluded that Congress passed CERCLA with two main 
purposes: “to facilitate the cleanup of potentially dangerous hazardous 
 52. Id. at 710. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 711.  
 55. Id. The court conceded, “We think there is a strong argument, however, that in the context of 
this definition, ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’ should be read to require affirmative human action.” Id. at 714. 
Ultimately, however, the court would not decide the issue because, “[w]hile ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’ 
may not require affirmative human conduct, neither word denotes the gradual spreading of 
contamination alleged here.” Id.  
 56. Id. at 714-17. 
 57. Id. at 714-15. The court noted that “release” included “leaching,” which “is commonly used 
in the environmental context to describe this migration of contaminants.” Id. at 715. The court 
explained that “Congress’s use of the term ‘leaching’ in the definition of ‘release’ demonstrates that it 
was aware of the concept of passive migration in landfills and that it knew how to explicitly refer to 
that concept.” Id.  
 58. Id. at 715. 
 59. Id. at 715-16. 
 60. Id. at 716. The court explained that “[b]ecause CERCLA conditions the innocent owner 
defense on the defendant’s having purchased the property ‘after the disposal’ of hazardous waste at the 
property, ‘disposal’ cannot constitute the allegedly constant spreading of contaminants. Otherwise the 
defense would almost never apply, as there would generally be no point ‘after disposal.’” Id. See supra 
note 30. 
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waste sites and to force polluters to pay the costs associated with their 
pollution.”61 The court declared that its holding was consistent with the 
latter purpose62 and insisted that the first purpose was not undermined 
because “ample incentives remain[ed] to promote cleanup.”63  
In ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime Technology, Inc., the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Third Circuit’s decision in 
CDMG by holding that passive migration did not constitute disposal under 
CERCLA.64 In ABB, the current owners of the property sued prior owners 
for reimbursement under CERCLA.65 The plaintiffs contended that wastes 
had passively migrated through the soil.66 The court rejected the passive 
migration theory, adopting wholesale the reasoning of the Third Circuit in 
CDMG.67 Like the CDMG court, the ABB court also distinguished Nurad, 
explaining that “because the definition of disposal includes ‘leaking,’ 
some courts have concluded that prior owners are liable if they acquired a 
site with leaking barrels even though the prior owners’ actions are purely 
passive . . . . We express no opinion on this issue.”68  
In United States v. 150 Acres of Land,69 the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that passive disposal does not constitute disposal under 
CERCLA.70 In 150 Acres, the EPA removed nearly one thousand drums 
 61. Id. at 717 (citation omitted). 
 62. Id. The court said that those who owned property while hazardous wastes migrated “without 
their aid cannot reasonably be characterized as ‘polluters’.” Id. The court noted that excluding them 
would not let the actual polluters off the hook. Id. In addition, the court added that in many cases, 
[T]hese [prior] owners will pay for the pollution: if they disclose the fact that the land 
contains waste, their selling price will reflect the cost of CERCLA liability. If they have 
knowledge of contamination and do not disclose it to a transferee, they are liable for response 
costs even after the transfer. The only prior owners who will not pay any cleanup costs are 
those who bought and sold land with no knowledge that the land is contaminated. 
Id. at 717-18 (citations omitted). 
 63. Id. at 718. The court discussed incentives including: (1) the innocent owner defense in 
§9607(b)(3); (2) the liability provisions of § 9607(a); (3) the provisions imposing criminal liability for 
failure to report a release above a certain threshold; and (4) section 9601(35)(C) making an owner 
liable who transfers land with knowledge of contamination. Id.  
 64. 120 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 65. Id. at 353. 
 66. Id. at 354. Alternatively, the plaintiffs in ABB also contended that there had been leaking or 
spilling. Id. The court rejected the theory, finding that the plaintiffs had presented no evidence of any 
leakage or spilling during the ownership of the defendants. Id. at 357. 
 67. Id. at 358. The court explained that “although hazardous chemicals may have gradually 
spread underground while the dismissed defendants controlled the property (passive migration), we 
conclude that prior owners are not liable under CERCLA for migration.” Id. at 354.  
 68. Id. at 358 n.3. 
 69. 204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 70. Id. at 705. The case concerned 150 acres of real estate in Medina County Ohio. Id. at 700-01. 
The owners operated a farm equipment repair business on one end of the property and the wastes were 
found on another end of the property. Id at 701. 
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from a property in Ohio, about 450 of which were empty and 550 of which 
contained paint waste, red sludge, and laboratory chemicals.71 The federal 
government sued the current property owners for reimbursement costs and 
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.72 The 
district court determined that whether the owners were entitled to the 
innocent landowner defense depended on “whether the ‘disposal’ preceded 
the [current owner’s] acquisition of the property.”73  
The Sixth Circuit concluded that “the distinction between ‘disposal’ 
and ‘release’” was important to the determination and indicated that it 
would adopt the definition of disposal used by the CDMG and ABB 
courts.74 At the same time, the 150 Acres court went one step further: the 
court held that disposal requires active human conduct, and, unlike the 
cases it cited for this proposition, the court did not distinguish Nurad.75 
The court concluded that there had been no disposal, explaining that “[i]n 
the absence of any evidence that there was human activity involved in 
whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property 
since the [defendants] have owned it, we hold that the [defendants] have 
not ‘disposed’ of hazardous substances on the property.”76  
III. RECONSIDERING PASSIVE DISPOSAL  
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp. (“Carson I”) first appeared 
in federal district court in 1997, after the CDMG appellate opinion, but 
before the ABB and 150 Acres opinions.77 In Carson, the current owners of 
the property sued several former owners and operators for reimbursement 
 71. Id. at 701-02. The case mentions that soil samples revealed high levels of contamination, but 
it does not specifically refer to a leak or migration of wastes. Id. at 701. Because there were barrels of 
wastes involved, one can infer that there was a leak and possibly migration after the leak. Id. at 701-
02. 
 72. Id. at 700.  
 73. Id. at 705. 
 74. Id. at 705-06. 
 75. Id. at 706. 
 76. Id. The 150 Acres court further held that summary judgment was not appropriate on two 
issues: (1) whether wastes were “released” after the owners acquired the property; and (2) whether 
they were entitled to the innocent landowner defense. Id. at 706, 711. 
 77. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 990 F. Supp. 1188 (C.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter 
Carson I]. The Ninth Circuit previously acknowledged, but declined to address, the passive 
migration/disposal issue in Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 
(9th Cir. 1992). In Kaiser, the court said, “Congress did not limit the term to the initial introduction of 
hazardous material onto property. Indeed, such a crabbed interpretation would subvert Congress’ goal 
that parties who are responsible for contaminating property be held accountable for the cost of 
cleaning it up.” Id. at 1342-43.  
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of cleanup costs under CERCLA.78 Carson operated a mobile home park 
on the property.79 The defendant, a prior owner, was a partnership that had 
also operated a mobile home park on the property.80  
In 1994, Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. discovered “tar-like” and “slag” 
materials that it alleged were dumped on the property by Unocal, a party 
that had previously leased the property.81 The materials were removed in 
1995.82 In the district court, Carson alleged that the partnership defendants 
were owners of the facility at the time hazardous materials were disposed 
of, triggering liability under § 9607(a)(2).83 Carson relied on Nurad to 
support a passive migration theory.84 Both parties moved for summary 
judgment.85  
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants,86 
holding that passive migration did not constitute disposal under 
CERCLA.87 The Carson I court explained that the plaintiffs’ only 
evidence showed that the materials had been deposited before the 
 78. Carson I, 990 F. Supp. at 1191. The Carson action also included claims under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, Clean Water Act, and state common law claims. Id. The owners also 
sued government parties. Id.  
 79. Id. at 1192. The current owners owned a 70-acre parcel of land in Carson, California. Id. 
About 17 acres of the property constituted an undeveloped wetlands and a natural drainage course. Id. 
The upstream drainage area included industrial and residential properties, collectively the 
“Government Defendants.” Id.  
 80. Id. at 1194. The partnership defendants owned the property from 1977 and 1983. Id. at 1192, 
1194. Defendant Unocal Corporation held a leasehold interest in the property between 1945 and 1983. 
Id. at 1192. Unocal used the property for petroleum production and operated a number of oil wells, 
pipelines, and above ground storage tanks and production facilities. Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. Unocal 
Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Carson II].  
 81. Carson I, 990 F. Supp. at 1192. Plaintiffs discovered the contamination as part of an effort to 
refinance their mortgage. A prospective lender required the investigation. Id. The lender’s 
investigation revealed that (1) the substances had been on the property for several decades prior to 
development as a mobile home park; (2) that the material was some form of waste or by product from 
petroleum production, covering a 30 by 160 foot area in the wetlands; (3) that the materials in the soil 
around the area contained elevated levels of petroleum hydrocarbons (THP) and lead; and (4) up 
gradient soil sample samples also contained elevated THP and lead levels. Carson II, 227 F.3d at 
1199-1200. 
 82. Carson I, 990 F. Supp. at 1192. In five days of cleanup, 1,042 tons of materials were 
removed. Carson II, 227 F.3d at 1200. 
 83. Carson I, 990 F. Supp. at 1194.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1191-92.  
 86. Id. at 1191.  
 87. Id. at 1194. The district court held that the CERCLA claims failed on two alternative 
independent grounds. Id. First, removal was not necessary under CERCLA. Id. at 1193. Second, 
passive migration did not constitute disposal. Id. at 1194. The Ninth Circuit later reversed on both 
grounds. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter 
Carson III]. The passive disposal claim only applied to partnership defendants because the migration 
theory only applied to those defendants. Carson I, 990 F. Supp. at 1194. Carson claimed that defendant 
Unocal originally deposited the substances. Id. at 1192. See supra note 80. 
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partnership defendants owned the property.88 The court would not accept 
the argument that the defendants were liable merely because “lead from 
the tar-like and slag materials leaked into the surrounding soil” during the 
defendants’ ownership.89 The district court relied on the reasoning of the 
Third Circuit in CDMG.90  
In Carson II, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that passive migration 
did constitute disposal under CERCLA.91 First, the Carson II panel said 
that “discharge,” “spill,” and “leak” clearly have passive meanings, that 
support a passive theory of liability.92 Second, the court insisted that 
disposal represents more than the initial placement of the substances on a 
property.93 The court stated that in consideration of the CERCLA’s 
remedial purposes, “‘disposal’ should be read broadly to include the 
subsequent ‘move[ment], dispers[al], or release [of such substances] 
during landfill excavations and fillings’.”94 Finally, the Carson II court 
argued that a passive interpretation was more appropriate in light of 
CERCLA’s strict liability emphasis.95  
[W]hile the statute was surely designed . . . to impose the costs of 
cleanup on ‘responsible parties’ the imperative was to create a 
mechanism for prompt cleanup and Congress was well aware that 
many directly responsible parties were insolvent or no longer in 
existence. For that reason, traditional causation requirements were 
abandoned in favor of a strict liability regime. The categories of 
PRPs incorporated in the liability provisions are correspondingly 
broad, sweeping in parties who may have done nothing 
 88. Id. at 1194.  
 89. Id. Plaintiff also contended that “lead from the storm water runoff leaked onto the property 
during the time that they were owners.” Id. at 1192. 
 90. Id. at 1195. The Carson I court discussed the limits of CERCLA liability, explaining that: 
While CERCLA was intended to reach broadly, it also clearly expresses limits to the 
contemplated statutory liability. To find otherwise would subject previous owners who had no 
knowledge of or control over hazardous substances on their property to liability under the 
statute. This result is in stark conflict with the intent of CERCLA, which is to affix the 
ultimate cost of cleaning up disposal sites on the parties responsible for the contamination. 
Id. (citing Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1340). 
 91. Carson II, 227 F.3d at 1210. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, 
affirming the district court holdings on the state law claims. Id. at 1199. 
 92. Id. at 1206-07. 
 93. Id. at 1207.  
 94. Id. (quoting Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1342 (alteration in original)). 
 95. Id.  
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affirmatively to contribute to the contamination at a site and forcing 
them to disprove causation as an affirmative defense.96  
The Carson II panel stated that a passive migration theory of liability 
was entirely consistent with this scheme.97  
The Carson II court also explained why it was not persuaded by the 
CDMG decision.98 First, the Ninth Circuit explained that “even if [the 
court] were to concede that these concerns do indeed arise from reading 
‘disposal’ to include passive migration, it is far from obvious that an 
‘active-only’ interpretation must prevail.”99 The court noted that the active 
theory of disposal “creates inconsistencies of its own.”100 For example, the 
court argued that an active theory assumes “that Congress intended to 
create an irrational distinction between prior owners” because a prior 
owner who owned the property while wastes passively migrated would not 
be liable regardless of whether he knew.101 At the same time, the court 
argued, prior owners who owned the property while wastes were actively 
disposed of would be liable “even if they were in no way responsible for, 
or connected with, the disposal.”102 Second, the court in Carson II pointed 
to the need for broad construction of a remedial statute such as 
CERCLA.103 Third, the court noted the apparent redundancy between 
“release” and “disposal.”104 The court suggested that a reading allowing 
the terms to overlap would not compromise the purposes of the statute.105  
The Carson II court concluded that the district court’s analysis would 
unfairly immunize the partnership defendants in the present case.106 The 
court rejected such an unfair outcome, stating that the partnership 
defendants were no less guilty than the current owners because both 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1208.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1210.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1208-09. 
 104. Id. at 1209.  
 105. Id. The Carson II court explained that “[t]he question is whether Congress intended to avoid 
the particular redundancy that would result from reading ‘disposal’ in accordance with the passive 
terms in its definition and whether this particular redundancy is one we should care about.” Id. The 
court also noted that an “active” or “affirmative conduct” interpretation is also not required to preserve 
the innocent landowner defense. Id. at 1209-10. The court considered that the discrepancy in 
interpretations would be “avoided by assuming that Congress meant what it said – i.e., that a defendant 
need only show that he or she purchased the property either (1) after disposal or (2) after placement.” 
Id. at 1210 n.20. 
 106. Id. at 1210. 
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parties were owners while the contaminants migrated into the soil.107  
Rehearing the case en banc,108 the Ninth Circuit in Carson III reversed 
the three-judge panel.109 The Carson III court held that passive migration 
could not constitute a disposal under CERCLA.110 The court began with 
the plain meaning of the statute,111 considered the reading of the statute as 
a whole,112 the purpose of the statute,113 the effect of inconsistent 
readings,114 and the legislative history of the statute.115  
In Carson III, the court began its analysis by using the language of the 
United States Supreme Court concerning statutory construction.116 The en 
 107. Id. The court noted that the only significant difference between the partnership defendants 
and the current owners was that during the partnership defendants’ ownership, Unocal was producing 
oil on the property. Id. The court reasoned that the partnership defendants had more of a reason to 
watch against contamination than the current owners. Id.  
In his partial dissent, Judge Weiner argued that the definition of disposal does not lend itself to any 
passive interpretation. Id. at 1213 (Weiner, J. dissenting). Judge Weiner reasoned that “the statutory 
scheme requires that even [‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’] be understood to imply some kind of active human 
conduct.” Id. He stated that “[t]he statutory distinction between ‘disposal’ and ‘release’ supports this 
limitation.” Id. at 1213. Weiner’s advocacy of an active interpretation stressed the importance of 
concurrent human conduct and involvement with the source of the disposal. 
To me, something “spills” only when it is actively emptied or, because of human action or 
inaction, is placed in a position where gravity, or the elements taking their natural course, 
cause the contents to be emptied into the environment. In the dictionary, spill is defined in its 
verb tense as “to cause or allow to pour, splash, or fall out.” Whether a substance pours, 
splashes or falls, human conduct was necessary ab initio to create the situation permitting the 
spill to occur, and it is this conduct with which I believe the statute is concerned.  
[Similarly] “leak” is defined as “to permit to enter or escape through a leak.” Even an 
accidental leak requires human activity to cause it. Whether one let a metal drum rust to the 
point of leakage or fails to ensure the container is leakproof before it is filled, leaks don’t 
occur without someone actively placing the hazardous waste in the container and creating the 
conditions under which it could, with the passage of time, begin to escape. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 108. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 240 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 109. Carson III, 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 110. Id. at 867.  
 111. Id. at 878-80.  
 112. Id. at 880-84.  
 113. Id. at 880-81.  
 114. Id. at 881-84. 
 115. Id. at 884-87. 
 
 116. Id. at 877. The court began its analysis using quotes from United States Supreme Court cases. 
The court began by explaining, “When interpreting a statute, ‘[o]ur task is to construe what Congress 
has enacted.’” Id. (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 150 (2001)). Next, the Ninth Circuit 
stated, “‘We begin, as always, with the language of the statute.’” Id. at 878. (quoting Duncan, 533 U.S. 
at 172.) As to explicit definitions in statutes, the court said, “‘When a statute includes an explicit 
definition, [however,] we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary 
meaning.’” Id. at 878 (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000)). The court also quoted 
its own language regarding statutory interpretation: “We will resort to legislative history, even where 
the plain language is unambiguous, ‘where the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress meant 
something other than what it said.’” Id. at 877 (quoting Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d 
747,753 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
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banc panel concluded that “[t]he plain meaning of the terms used to define 
‘disposal’ compels the conclusion that there was no ‘disposal’ during the 
Partnership Defendants ‘ownership, because the movement of the 
contamination . . . cannot be characterized as a ‘discharge, deposit, 
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing’.”117 The court noted that 
the dictionary definition of “disposal” includes both passive and active 
meanings.118 “We therefore reject the absolute binary ‘active/passive’ 
distinction used by some courts.”119 The court said that the proper inquiry 
in such cases was to determine whether the movement of contaminants in 
a particular set of facts constituted a disposal.120 The court determined that 
its approach was “consistent with CERCLA’s purposes, minimiz[ing] 
internal inconsistency in the statute, and present[ing] no conflict with 
CERCLA’s legislative history.”121  
The Carson III court also found that reading the statute as a whole 
presented no reason to construe the terms within the meaning of disposal 
any differently.122 First, the court argued that the purposes of the statute 
were still achieved under its construction.123 Second, the court insisted that 
the inconsistencies and the problems with the innocent landowner defense 
and other affirmative defenses were minimized with an interpretation that 
was not extreme.124 For example, the court explained that the innocent 
owner defense would be unnecessary if all passive migration constituted 
“disposal,” and the defense would be nearly impossible to request if all 
disposal were active.125 Third, the court found that CERCLA’s sparse 
 117. Carson III, 270 F.3d at 877-78.  
 118. Id. at 878-79. 
 119. Id. at 879.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 878. 
 122. Id. at 880-84.  
 123. Id. at 881. In the Carson III court’s opinion, “if ‘disposal’ is interpreted to exclude all passive 
migration, there would be little incentive for a landowner to examine his property for decaying 
disposal tanks, prevent them from spilling or leaking, or to clean up contamination once it was found.” 
Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that its conclusion was limited to passive soil migration, not passive 
migration as a whole. Id. According to the court, other types of passive migration might be consistent 
with “the plain meaning of the terms used to define ‘disposal’” under CERCLA. Id. 
In adopting this plain meaning construction, we are mindful that the statute will be applied in 
a myriad of circumstances, many of which we cannot predict today . . . . This approach does 
not rule out the scenario in which “spilling,” “leaking,” or perhaps other terms in some 
circumstances, encompasses passive migration.  
Id. at 883-84.  
 124. Id. at 881.  
 
 125. Id. at 882-83. The court also noted provisions unrelated to the meaning of disposal that are 
nevertheless important. Id. at 884. For example, CERCLA provisions allowing proportional payment 
after initial liability has attached help to insure that a party who has minimally contributed is not held 
jointly and severally liable. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/12
p945 Coleman Note book pages.doc 1/13/2003   1:14 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] DISPOSING OF LEAKS AND SPILLS 961 
 
 
 
 
 
legislative history clearly supported a definition that included some 
passive disposal.126 The legislative history revealed that Congress had 
considered environmental threats that did not involve affirmative human 
conduct.127  
The Carson III court reviewed and analyzed the decisions of other 
circuits involving passive disposal and passive migration of hazardous 
waste, but found no clear answer.128 The court concluded, “although all of 
the cases reference the active/passive distinction in some manner, there is 
no clear dichotomy among the cases that have interpreted ‘disposal.’ 
Rather the cases fall in a continuum.”129 
Considering the passive migration on the Carson Harbor property, the 
en banc panel reasoned, “[i]f we try to characterize this passive soil 
migration in plain English, a number of words come to mind, including 
gradual ‘spreading,’ ‘migration,’ ‘seeping,’ ‘oozing,’ and possibly 
‘leaching.’ But certainly none of those words fits within the plain and 
common meaning [of disposal under CERCLA].”130 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The above cases present several issues. First, both courts and 
commentators have largely failed to distinguish between passive disposal 
of wastes in general and passive migration of wastes as a particular 
method of disposal.131 Both courts and commentators have often 
recognized a “sharp” circuit split among the appellate courts.132 However, 
 126. Id. at 885.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 876.  
 129. Id. at 876-77.  
 130. Id. at 879. The Carson III court added that the contamination at issue could not be 
characterized as a deposit “because there was neither a deposit by someone, nor does the term deposit 
encompass the gradual spread of contaminants.” Id. This addition addressed the dissenting judge’s 
argument that passive migration was clearly within the term “deposit,” therefore constituting disposal 
under CERCLA. Id. at 889-90. 
 131. Articles both in favor of and against passive disposal theories discussed passive migration 
and passive disposal as if they are necessarily synonymous. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 10179 
(“The phrase ‘passive disposal’ is often used to describe this rationale for imposing liability on one 
whose only sin was possession of property at the time of migration of hazardous substances that had 
been actively disposed of by another.”); Lipinski, supra note 7, at 108-9 (interpreting the Nurad 
holding as specifically addressing and sustaining passive migration as a form of disposal under 
CERCLA); May, supra note 5, at 404 (“[Some cases] distinguished Nurad on the facts and essentially 
rejected the theory of passive migration set forth in Nurad.”).  
 132. Carson II, 227 F.3d at 1206. See also Lee, supra note 7, at 91 (“With this ambiguous 
statutory language, the courts are sharply divided.”); ‘Disposal’ for CERCLA Liability Purposes May 
Include Passive Migration of Waste, 69 U.S. LAW WEEK 1169 (2000) (“A ‘disposal’ under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act may include passive 
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as the Carson III court conceded, “those opinions cannot be shoehorned 
into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of 
their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, depending in large 
part on the factual circumstances of the case.”133  
The holdings suggest a “more nuanced range of views” because the 
cases suggest several different scenarios implicating passive disposal 
issues.134 In scenario one, John Doe owns land on which he disposed of 
containers of hazardous wastes. The wastes leak or spill out of the 
containers, contaminating the surrounding soil. In a second scenario, Jane 
Doe owns land on which a previous owner disposed of containers of 
hazardous wastes, and Jane Doe might or might not know that these 
wastes have been disposed of on her property. In this scenario, the wastes 
also leak or spill from their containers, contaminating Jane’s property. In 
the third scenario, Mary Doe owns land on which a former owner or 
operator buried wastes or discarded wastes on the land and the wastes 
migrate, continuously contaminating a larger area. 
Second, the cases suggest an issue that is more complex than whether 
the definition of disposal is properly interpreted as requiring active human 
migration of hazardous waste, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held Sept. 14, weighing 
in on a circuit split.”).  
 133. Carson III, 270 F.3d at 875.  
 134. Several articles spell out their own scenarios. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 10178-79 
(citations omitted).  
The factual scenario that creates the greatest difficulty . . . is quite common . . . [S]ome person 
or entity allowed hazardous substances to enter the environment through an act or omission, 
such as pouring waste on the land, burying drums which subsequently ruptured, or using 
underground storage tanks containing hazardous substances and abandoning those tanks in 
place. Later, after completion of this active disposal, the site was leased or sold to a person or 
entity who may not have used hazardous substances at all, and may have had no knowledge 
of prior disposal practices at the site. Having been released into the environment by prior 
owners or operators, however, hazardous substances continue to migrate through soil and 
groundwater, coming to rest in locations other than where originally placed.  
Imposing liability on those persons who actively placed waste into the environment or 
abandoned waste in such a way that it could escape into the environment could hardly offend 
traditional notions of justice and fair play. But in Nurad, its predecessors, and its progeny, the 
courts go further, finding that mere movement of substances through soil and groundwater 
constitutes “disposal,” making the unwitting owner or operator—who took no action with 
respect to the waste—“the owner or operator at the time of disposal.” 
See also Bronston, supra note 7, at 610 (citations omitted). 
In this scenario, the original owner of the land generates hazardous waste and thereby 
contaminates the property. A second owner then uses the land for a different purpose, does 
not create any new waste, and is not aware of the previous contamination. During the second 
owner’s tenure, the previously deposited hazardous material spreads via leaching or 
migration. Finally, a third owner assumes control of the land and retains ownership at the 
time of the required remedial activity. 
See also Caplan, supra note 7, at 10122. 
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conduct. The cases and articles suggest that what ultimately may be at 
issue for many is fairness.135 For some, liability will lie in the first scenario 
because John Doe is the one who made the deposit. John Doe concurrently 
and affirmatively contributed to the waste disposal. However, liability will 
not lie in the second or third scenario, regardless of the fact that one 
involved a leak, as in Nurad, and the other involves mere migration, as in 
CDMG. There would be no liability because in neither scenario did the 
PRP commit an affirmative, concurrent act in addition to the migration or 
leakage of wastes.136 
Preoccupied with concerns of fairness, many commentators and cases 
compare decisions such as Nurad and CDMG and conclude that “a sharp 
split in the federal court decisions has emerged.”137 Such statements 
completely overlook the fact that the CDMG court distinguished Nurad.138 
In contrast to the assertions of numerous articles on the issue, CDMG did 
not hold that all disposals must be active,139 and Nurad did not license 
 135. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 136. Nurad provides an excellent example of this point: In Nurad, there was a leak, but there was 
no concurrent conduct by the PRP. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. Several cases and 
courts suggest that the PRP’s lack of “fault” is especially objectionable. See supra notes 107, 135; 
infra notes 138, 141. Likewise, in CDMG, there was migration without concurrent conduct. See supra 
note 50 and accompanying text. 
 137. See May, supra note 5, at 385 (comparing Nurad and CDMG and rejecting Nurad). Accord 
Lee, supra note 7, at 91. Lee, supra note 7, at 91. See also Lipinski, supra note 7, at 97 (contrasting 
Nurad with CDMG and asserting, incorrectly, that the Nurad holding included passive migration.). Cf. 
Lipinski, supra note 7 (comparing Nurad and CDMG and rejecting the CDMG holding.) All of these 
articles assume that Nurad addressed passive migration, as opposed to a passive leak. See infra note 
140. 
 138. CDMG, 96 F.3d at 713. The ABB court noted the Nurad distinction as well. ABB, 120 F.3d at 
358 n.3. The Carson II panel noted that CDMG has distinguished Nurad, but apparently did not make 
much of the distinction: 
In any event, the CDMG court does not appear to have been completely convinced of its 
noscitur a sociis argument. The court said only that “Congress may have intended active 
meanings of ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling.’” The [CDMG] court went on to distinguish Nurad not 
on the theory that the Fourth Circuit wrongly interpreted disposal to include passive 
migration, but rather on the narrower ground that although disposal must include “leaking” 
from an underground storage tank, as in Nurad, disposal clearly does not include the gradual 
spread of wastes through a landfill. All very well, except that in conceding that some forms of 
passive migration are indeed covered by the passive terms in the statute, the entire foundation 
of the court’s analysis is undermined-all the inconsistencies and redundancies identified as 
reasons to avoid a passive reading are present under its own reading. 
Carson II, 227 F.3d at 1209 n.18 (citations omitted). Apparently the court implicitly read Nurad as 
addressing passive migration and passive leaking as one and the same. Id.  
 
 139. See, e.g., 150 Acres, 204 F.3d at 705 (“[T]wo circuits [in CDMG and ABB] have recently 
limited ‘disposal’ to spills occurring by human intervention.”); Caplan, supra note 7, at 10124 
(asserting that the CDMG court held that spilling and leaking must be read as requiring active 
conduct); Lipinski, supra note 7, at 98-99 (asserting that the CDMG court held that all disposals 
require active conduct); May, supra note 5, at 407-408 (explaining that the CDMG court and the ABB 
court rejected the passive disposal theory entirely). 
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mere passive migration.140  
The CDMG court did not address passive disposal generally, but 
instead addressed the narrow issue of passive migration.141 Ultimately, the 
CDMG court did not decide whether all disposals should be active.142 In 
addition, Nurad concerned leaking and never extended its holding to 
migration where no leak had occurred.143 ABB, a second case cited as 
being in opposition to Nurad, not only left the Nurad holding intact, but 
also specifically included “leaking” and “spilling” as proper instances of 
disposal.144  
Federal courts have compounded the confusion by following CDMG 
blindly. These courts have failed to note that CDMG did not address 
broader instances of passive disposal, and did not consider whether the 
facts of a case involved passive leaking or passive migration.145 For 
 In some senses, the Lipinski comment was unclear. First Lipinski wrote, “[T]he [CDMG] court 
determined that, for purposes of ‘disposal’ under CERCLA, there is a requirement of action.” Lipinski, 
supra note 7, at 98-99. In the following paragraph, however, Lipinski wrote, “The court in CDMG 
refused to decide whether passive migration could ever be included in ‘disposal,’ holding more 
narrowly that the type of migration involved in CDMG cannot be ‘disposal.’” Id. at 99. 
 140. Id. at 97 (asserting that the Nurad holding explicitly licensed passive migration). Accord 
Caplan, supra note 7, at 10122-23; Clanton, supra note 30, at 258; Stephens, supra note 7, at 10180-
81; Bronston, supra note 7, at 610-11; Lee, supra note 7, at 89; McMillen, supra note 7, at 274.  
 141. CDMG, 96 F.3d at 711. 
 142. Id. at 714. In dicta, the CDMG court did indicate that perhaps leaking should require active 
conduct: “We think there is a strong argument, however that in the context of this definition, ‘leaking’ 
and ‘spilling’ should be read to require active human conduct.” Id. at 714. The court discussed the 
plain meanings of the words “leaking” and “spilling,” and concluded, “In the context of these . . . 
words . . . Congress may have intended active meanings of ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling.’ But we need not 
address this question in the broad terms of whether disposal always requires active human conduct.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 143. The Nurad court did use the word “migration” once: “The [district] court held . . . that [the 
defendant] was not liable—even though passive migration of hazardous substances may have occurred 
during his ownership—because he did not take an active role in managing the tanks or their contents.” 
Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844. The Nurad opinion seems to refer to a migration of substances after an 
appropriate instance of passive disposal—in other words, after passive disposal in the form of a leak. 
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. Nurad suggests that the PRP need not have been 
actively involved in the causing the leak, not that there need not have been a leak at all. Id. See also 
Nurad, Inc. v. Wm. E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,079 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 
1991). 
 144. See supra note 66. See also ABB, 120 F.3d at 358 (“[W]e interpret the word ‘disposal’ as 
limited to spilling, discharging, leaking, etc., and not to passive migration.”).  
 
 145. 150 Acres, 204 F.3d at 705-06. The court cited CDMG and ABB as the sources of its holding, 
yet holds that all disposal must be active. Id. The court reasoned that “[b]ecause ‘disposal’ is defined 
primarily in terms of active words such as injection, deposit, and placing, the potentially passive words 
‘spilling’ and ‘leaking’ should be interpreted actively.” Id. at 706. Of course, not all cases have failed 
to distinguish migration and leaking. In New York v. Almy Bros., Inc. the district court held a party 
liable under CERCLA for the passive leaking of drums, citing the Nurad decision. 866 F. Supp. 668, 
676 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). The court said that “The [parties] cannot escape liability based upon their 
argument that they took no affirmative action that ‘caused’ the release of the hazardous substances into 
the environment.” Id. at 676. Where there was clear evidence that a leak had occurred, the court said, 
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example, the court in 150 Acres erroneously interpreted both CDMG and 
ABB as cases that “limited ‘disposal’ to spills occurring by human 
intervention.”146 In addition, the Carson II court quickly agreed with 
Nurad and rejected the CDMG holding without noting that the cases 
addressed different, though related, issues.147  
One explanation for the disparity in the case law is that courts and 
commentators alike have feared that if the Nurad principle—permitting 
liability for passive leaking—were extended to permit passive migration, 
the result would be both unfair and incongruous with the statute. The 
result would be objectionable because—allegedly—if PRPs were liable for 
migration, all owners or operators in the chain of title would be liable long 
after a leak or spill had stopped.148 With such an interpretation, many 
contend that the innocent owner defense would be useless.149  
However, it is far from obvious that because passive migration is an 
impermissible theory, other forms of passive disposal, such as passive 
leaking or spilling, must be impermissible as well.150 First, the word 
“migration” does not appear in the definition of “disposal” under 
CERCLA.151 “Leaking” and “spilling” do appear in the definition.152 Thus, 
the plain language of the definition of “disposal” supports both the Nurad 
holding permitting leaking and the CDMG holding precluding passive 
migration. Second, there is nothing in the statute or the legislative history 
“The state need not pinpoint at what precise moment leakage may have begun.” Id. at 677. Likewise, 
in Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme Inc., the Sixth Circuit applied an appropriately narrow rule and held 
that passive migration did not constitute disposal under CERCLA. 264 F.3d 692, 697-98 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
 146. 150 Acres, 204 F.3d at 705. 
 147. Carson II, 227 F.3d at 1207. 
 148. See, e.g., CDMG, 96 F.3d at 715; Snedicker Developers Ltd. P’ship v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 
984, 989 (E.D. Mich., 1991) (“assuming that [waste] may migrate long after it has been introduced 
into the environment, [this] interpretation of . . . disposal would effectively impose cleanup liability on 
any owner in a chain of title . . . if the drafters of CERCLA had intended such a far reaching 
consequence, they would have said so explicitly.”); In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. at 565 
(“[Section 9607(a)(2) provides] an action against prior owners or operators who owned the site at the 
time the hazardous substances were introduced into the environment . . . . Otherwise, [the provision 
includes] all owners or operators in the chain of title subsequent to the contamination.” (quoting 
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1989)). Several articles present a similar 
argument. See Clanton, supra note 30, at 263; May, supra note 5, at 410-11.  
 149. See, e.g., CDMG, 96 F.3d at 716; ABB, 120 F.3d at 358.  
 150. Carson III, 270 F.3d at 880 (“This approach does not rule out the scenario in which 
‘spilling,’ ‘leaking,’ or perhaps other terms in some circumstances, encompasses passive migration.”). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). 
 
 152. Id. In fact, several courts hold that leaks do constitute a “disposal” triggering liability. See 
Reading Co. v. Philadelphia, 155 B.R. at 890. In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 180 B.R. 375 (D. 
Mass. 1989). Other cases hold that “spilling” is a disposal triggering liability. See Amland Properties 
Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1989); Emhart Indus. Inc. v. Duracell 
Intern. Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Tenn. 1987). 
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indicating that wherever “leaking” and “spilling” appear they must have an 
active meaning.153 Third, the words “leaking” and “spilling” have common 
meanings with preponderantly passive connotations. For example, a leak 
by definition refers to an unintended or unknown escape or release.154 No 
resort is necessary to the meanings suggested by the remaining words in 
the definition.  
Furthermore, in the environmental context, the word “leaching” is 
commonly used to refer to migration through soil.155 “Leaching” does not 
appear in the definition of “disposal,” but it clearly appears in the 
definition of “release.”156 This distinction further supports a conclusion 
that migration can be excluded in interpreting disposal, without excluding 
passive instances of leaking.  
Courts and commentators have also argued that a disposal triggering 
liability under CERCLA must be active because “release” must 
necessarily have a broader definition than “disposal.”157 This argument is 
likewise flawed. “Release” is defined under CERCLA as “any spilling, 
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, 
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment.”158 
“Disposal” is defined as a “discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, 
spilling, leaking, or placing.”159 The definition of “release” explicitly 
includes the word “disposal” as well as all of the words defining 
 153. Carson III, 270 F.3d at 878 (“‘We must presume that words used more than once in the same 
statute have the same meaning.’” (quoting Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 154. The definition of “leak” in Webster’s dictionary is: “1. an unintended hole, crack, or the like, 
through which liquid, gas, light, etc., enters or escapes: a leak in the roof. 2. an act or instance of 
leaking. 3. any means of unintended entrance or escape.” The Dictionary goes on the define “leak” as 
“7. to let a liquid, gas, light, etc., enter or escape, as through an unintended hole or crack.” Random 
House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1094 (2d ed. 1997). “Spill” is defined as: “to run or fall from 
a container, esp. accidental or wastefully.” Id. at 1837.  
 155. See supra notes 54, 106 and accompanying text. Cf. Carson II, 227 F.3d at 1207. The Carson 
II court considered migration to be a part of the definition of disposal, even though they were aware of 
the common interpretation of the word “leaching.” Id. at 1208 (considering the CDMG court’s 
reference to the inclusion of the word “leaching” in the definition of “release”). The Carson II court 
stated, “Since the prescribed definition [of disposal] includes passive migration by its own terms, we 
are bound to give effect to that definition.” Id.  
 156. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 157. See 150 Acres, 204 F.3d at 706; Peterson, 806 F. Supp. at 1352; May, supra note 7, at 393. 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). The definition reads in its entirety: “The term ‘release’ means any 
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, 
dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, 
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or 
contaminant).” Id.  
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2000). “The terms ‘disposal’, ‘hazardous waste’, and ‘treatment’ shall 
have the meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6903].” Id.  
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“disposal.”160 This overlap suggests that although “release” is defined 
more broadly than “disposal”, the definition is not significantly broader. In 
fact, the significant overlap provides a stronger argument that the 
definitions are not exclusive. As the Nurad court recognized, to argue that 
“leaking” has different meanings in different places in the statute 
“arbitrarily deprive[s] these words of their passive element by imposing a 
requirement of active participation as a prerequisite to liability.”161 
In other words, no strong support exists for the assertion that absolutely 
no passive disposal constitutes a “disposal” under CERCLA. The 
arguments supporting exclusion of passive migration as a basis for liability 
do not similarly support exclusion of passive “leaking” or “spilling.”162  
V. PROPOSAL  
One problem that the cases suggest is that by failing to distinguish 
Nurad and CDMG, many courts have reached decisions that are 
overbroad. Thus, some cases hold that passive disposal in general may 
never trigger liability under section 9607(a)(2), though the facts only 
involve passive migration.163 A second problem in cases involving passive 
migration is that some courts might feel compelled by fairness concerns to 
extend the holding to passive disposal generally. A few commentators 
urge that it seems unfair to hold a party liable when he/she did not act 
affirmatively.164 
Courts should be careful on both counts. First, federal courts should 
recognize that there is no sharp circuit split; in fact, one might question 
whether there is a split at all.165 The only decisions that appear to oppose 
each other are the holdings of Nurad and 150 Acres.166 Of all the circuit 
court cases, only Nurad and 150 Acres decided whether passive leaking 
constituted disposal under CERCLA.167 Additionally, the 150 Acres court 
evidently misinterpreted the other federal appellate decisions because 
 160. Id.  
 161. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845.  
 162. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.  
 163. See generally 150 Acres, 204 F.3d 698. 
 164. See supra note 8; Stephens, supra note 7, at 10183 (“Courts should not expand CERCLA’s 
broad liability scheme lightly and without any evidence of culpability of the parties sought to be held 
liable.”). 
 165. 270 F.3d at 876.  
 166. See supra notes 39, 69-70 and accompanying text. These holdings were addressed to passive 
disposal specifically. 
 
 167. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844 (“[W]e must ask whether recovery against [prior owners] is 
nonetheless barred because no ‘disposal of hazardous wastes took place on their watch. The district 
court took a narrow view of the word ‘disposal,’ limiting it to affirmative human conduct.”).  
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those decisions do not support its broad holding.168 
Courts should also keep in mind that the word “migration,” whether 
passive or otherwise, does not appear in the definition of disposal.169 
“Leaking” does.170 It is therefore unnecessary to address instances of 
passive leaking or other forms of passive disposal where the facts do not 
present them. In other words, the holdings and the language of the cases 
should not address passive disposal generally if the facts allege passive 
migration. At the same time, courts should not address passive migration 
where the facts involve passive leaking.171 
On the other hand, where a court grasps this distinction, but 
nevertheless wishes to preclude all passive disposal from triggering 
liability under § 9607(a)(2), it should resist the temptation. First, while it is 
important to make the “responsible party” pay, CERCLA recognizes that 
this is not always possible.172 If CERCLA were based simply on making 
the responsible party pay, only the party who made the initial deposit 
would be liable. Instead, CERCLA makes current owners liable if they do 
not qualify for one of the restricted defenses.173 Second, CERCLA largely 
imposes strict liability. Requiring another level of causation interferes with 
Congress’s intent.174 Third, a party who affirmatively causes a disposal is 
not necessarily more responsible for the release than one who passively 
causes a disposal.175 A party associated with a passive disposal might have 
full knowledge of the hazardous wastes entering the environment.176 The 
fact that such a party does not tip over the wastes might not make the party 
 168. See supra notes 75, 146 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 170. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 171. See generally 150 Acres, 204 F.3d at 698. 
 172. Several courts state that the purpose of CERCLA is to make the responsible party pay. See 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[The] two 
. . . main purposes of CERCLA” are “prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all 
cleanup costs on the responsible party.”). CERCLA’s strict liability focus clearly realizes, however, 
that the party responsible for the initial deposit cannot always pay. See supra note 96 and 
accompanying text.  
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2000). 
 174. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 846. (“The district court’s view of the CERCLA definition of disposal is 
also at odds with CERCLA’s strict liability emphasis. The trigger to liability under § 9607(a)(2) is 
ownership or operation of a facility at the time of disposal, not culpability or responsibility for the 
contamination.”) CERCLA’s strict liability application is well settled in the case law. See New Castle 
County v. Halliburton NUS Corp. 111 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (3d Cir. 1997) (“A section 107 cost 
recovery action imposes strict liability on potentially responsible persons for costs associated with 
hazardous waste clean-up and site remediation.”); See CERCLA Overview, supra note 14, at 402.  
 175. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845. 
 176. Id.  
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any less responsible.177 Fourth, courts should remember that CERCLA 
liability might later be apportioned to account for fairness. Parties who are 
“not as guilty” might qualify for defenses, or be apportioned a smaller 
amount of liability by the judge under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).178  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The courts in Carson III, Nurad, and CDMG reached correct 
conclusions. Circuit split or not, between the three decisions, courts should 
be able to find guidance to reach a result that is consistent with the strict 
liability scheme of CERCLA.  
Although the legal question seems finally settled, a policy question 
remains. The question in these cases is not simply whether a leak or spill 
of hazardous wastes is passive or active. Rather, the question is whether 
the leak or spill must be associated with concurrent, affirmative conduct 
by the person who might be held liable. The inquiry seems to boil down to 
whether the PRP had anything to do with the wastes before the disposal.179 
This is an issue of guilt or liability, and perhaps it should be resolved by 
protesting CERCLA’s general strict liability scheme, and not through a 
strained interpretation of disposal. 
The Supreme Court has not heard many cases under CERCLA, and 
given its caseload, and the absence of a veritable circuit split, it is unlikely 
that the Court will address this issue in the future.180 The Court denied 
certiorari in the Carson case in April 2002.181 Under the current 
 177. Id.  
 178. This provision is entitled “contribution.” It reads:  
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable 
under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of 
this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance 
with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal 
law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable 
parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this 
subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the 
absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).  
 179.  See Stephens, supra note 7, at 10179-80: 
The disparity in the district and the appellate courts’ views of the scope of the term “disposal” 
hinged not on whether active human conduct is required to trigger “disposal,” but rather on 
whether disposal by “leaking” requires concurrent human conduct (the district court’s view) 
or whether it can simple occur as a result of prior human conduct (the Fourth Circuit’s view). 
 180. A Westlaw search for Unites States Supreme Court cases involving CERCLA resulted in 
only five cases. 
 181. See supra note 12.  
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administration and with other problems battling for our nation’s attention, 
it also seems unlikely that CERCLA is a priority for Congress. 182 
Therefore, it is currently up to the courts to define “disposal.” 
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